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Abstract
Over the years, researchers have studied the complexity of several decision versions of Nash
equilibrium in (symmetric) two-player games (bimatrix games). To the best of our knowledge,
the last remaining open problem of this sort is the following; it was stated by Papadimitriou in
2007: find a non-symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) in a symmetric game. We show that this
problem is NP-complete and the problem of counting the number of non-symmetric NE in a
symmetric game is #P-complete.
In 2005, Kannan and Theobald defined the rank of a bimatrix game represented by matrices
(A,B) to be rank(A+B) and asked whether a NE can be computed in rank 1 games in polynomial
time. Observe that the rank 0 case is precisely the zero sum case, for which a polynomial time
algorithm follows from von Neumann’s reduction of such games to linear programming. In 2011,
Adsul et. al. obtained an algorithm for rank 1 games; however, it does not solve the case of
symmetric rank 1 games. We resolve this problem.
1 Introduction
One of the major achievements of complexity theory in recent years is obtaining a fairly complete
understanding of the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a two-player game in
various situations; such a game can be represented by two payoff matrices (A,B), and therefore
is also known as bimatrix game. Of the few remaining open questions, we settle two in this paper
regarding symmetric bimatrix games. We note that symmetry arises naturally in numerous strategic
situations. In fact, while providing game theory with its central solution concept, Nash [12] felt
compelled to also define the notion of a symmetric game and prove, in a separate theorem, that such
(finite) games always admit a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., where all players play the same strategy.
Examples of well-known bimatrix games that are symmetric are Prisoners’ Dilemma and Rock-
Paper-Scissors. With the growth of the Internet, on which typically users are indistinguishable, the
relevance of symmetric games has further increased.
In a symmetric game all players participate under identical circumstances, i.e., strategy sets
and payoffs. Thus the payoff of a player i depends only on the strategy, s, played by her and the
multiset of strategies, S, played by the others, without reference to their identities; moreover, if
any other player j were to play s and the remaining players S, the payoff to j would be identical
to that of i. In case of a bimatrix game (A,B) such a symmetry translates to B = AT .
We first provide a brief summary of the known results. The seminal works of Daskalakis,
Goldberg and Papadimitriou [6], and Chen, Deng and Teng [2] proved that finding a NE in a
bimatrix game, or a symmetric NE in a symmetric bimatrix game, is PPAD-complete [13]. Before
the resolution of this long-standing question, researchers studied the complexity of computing a
NE with desired special properties. For numerous properties, these problems turned out to be
NP-hard1, even for the case of symmetric games [8, 5].
In 2005, Kannan and Theobald [9] defined the rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) to be rank(A+B)
and asked whether a NE can be computed in rank 1 games in polynomial time. They also gave an
example of a bimatrix rank 1 game that has disconnected NE, thereby providing evidence that the
problem would be a difficult one2. Observe that the rank 0 case is precisely the zero sum case, for
which a polynomial time algorithm follows from von Neumann’s reduction of such games to linear
programming. In 2011, Adsul et. al [1] answered this question in the affirmative; this appears to
be the first efficient algorithm for a problem having disconnected solutions. More recently, Mehta
[11] showed that for games of rank 3 or more, and for symmetric games of rank 6 or more, the
problem is PPAD-complete.
We now list the open problems we are aware of. In 2007, Papadimitriou [14] asked for the
complexity of finding a non-symmetric NE in a symmetric game. One motivation for this problem
may be the following. In some situations, it may be important to find a non-symmetric equilibrium
in a symmetric 2-player game. As an example, under a symmetric equilibrium, both players may
exhaust the same resource, for instance if they access the same web site, and this may be undesirable.
Mehta left open the problem of determining the complexity of the following problems: finding
a NE in a rank 2 game, and finding a symmetric NE in a symmetric game of rank 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.
In this paper, we show that Papadimitriou’s problem is NP-complete. We further show that
the problem of counting the number of non-symmetric NE in a symmetric game is #P-complete.
We also give a polynomial time algorithm for finding a symmetric NE in a symmetric game of rank
1One exception is the problem of checking if an evolutionarily stable strategy exist in symmetric 2-player game.
This problem was recently shown to be
∑
2
p
-hard by Conitzer [4]; containment in
∑
2
p
was shown by Etessami and
Lochbihler [7].
2von Stengel [16] went further to give a symmetric bimatrix rank 1 game that has exponentially many disconnected
symmetric Nash equilibria.
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1. In Section 5, we give some reasons to believe that finding a symmetric NE in a symmetric game
of rank 2 or more should not be in P.
Next, we note that given a symmetric bimatrix rank 1 game, the algorithm of Adsul et. al.
[1] is not guaranteed to produce a symmetric Nash equilibrium, as required in the definition of
a symmetric game. Furthermore, the symmetric NE of a symmetric rank 1 game can also be
disconnected, thereby making it a difficult problem from the viewpoint of obtaining a polynomial
time algorithm. In Section 1.1 we give the new ideas that are needed, in addition to those of
[1], to solve this problem. For an example of a well-known game having disconnected symmetric
equilibria, consider Battle of Sexes, with appropriate payoffs so that the game is symmetric.
Recently, McLennan and Tourky [10] gave the notion of imitation games, which simplified the
existing proofs of NP-completeness of [5] considerably for the case of symmetric games and led to
even more such results. In Appendix A we study further properties of imitation games.
1.1 New techniques
First problem: Next we give an overview of the approach to show NP (#P) hardness for comput-
ing (counting) non-symmetric NE in symmetric games. A quick look at the set of Nash equilibrium
problems proven NP-hard suggests Non-Unique NE [8], i.e., whether the given bimatrix game has
two or more NE, as the most suitable problem to reduce from. Furthermore, an obvious approach
is to use the standard reduction from a bimatrix game (A,B) (where both A > 0 and B > 0 are
m× n matrices) to a symmetric game, namely
M =
[
0 A
BT 0
]
For any non-zero vector z ≥ 0, let η(z) denote the normalized vector, i.e., its components are
non-negative and add to 1. It is easy to see that the Nash equilibria (a, b) of (A,B) are in one-to-
one correspondence with the symmetric NE, (η(a/v, b/w), η(a/v, b/w)) of M , where v = aTBb and
w = aTAb. Furthermore, from a non-symmetric NE ((a, b), (a′, b′)) of game (M,MT ), one can
obtain two potential equilibria for (A,B), namely (η(a′), η(b)) and (η(a), η(b′)); indeed, one can
readily confirm that they satisfy all complementarity conditions. However, there is a snag, namely
all four of vectors {a, b,a′, b′} may not be nonzero, or one set of vectors may be a scaled up version
of the other, thereby not yielding 2 NE for the game (A,B). In fact every NE (a, b) of (A,B) yields
a non-symmetric NE ((a,0), (0, b)) for the symmetric game (M,MT ), and such a non-symmetric
NE yields only one NE for (A,B).
Let us say that a NE has full support if both players play all their strategies. We first seek a
small dimensional symmetric game which has a unique NE and moreover this NE has full support.
Recently, [3] showed that all symmetric 2× 2 games always have pure NE, therefore leading us to
consider 3× 3 games. As shown in Lemma 2, the game (D,DT ), for the matrix D specified below,
has the right properties.
Next, let us define a “blown up” version of matrix D. For every k ∈ R, let Kn×m(k) be a
matrix with n rows and m columns with all entries equal to k, and define K to be the following
(1 +m+ n)× (1 +m+ n) matrix:
D =

0 4 02 0 4
3 2 0

 K =

 0 K1×m(4) K1×n(0)Km×1(2) Km×m(0) Km×n(4)
Kn×1(3) Kn×m(2) Kn×n(0)

 G = K +

 0 0 00 0 A
0 BT 0


Let a,a′ ∈ Rm, b, b′ ∈ Rn and c, c′ ∈ R. Now let x and y be the following (1+m+n)-dimensional
vectors, x = (c,a, b) and y = (c′,a′, b′). Define the collapse of a (1 +m + n)-dimensional vector
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say x = (c,a, b) to be the 3-dimensional vector whose first component is c, the second is the sum
of components of a and the third is the sum of components of b; we will denote this by cl(x).
Now it is easy to see that if (x,y) is a NE of (K,KT ) then (cl(x), cl(y)) must be a NE of (D,DT ).
Therefore, the NE of (K,KT ) must inherit the properties of the NE of D, and hence all four vectors
{a, b,a′, b′} must be nonzero!
The next key idea is to insert the given game (A,B) in this setup in such a way that the
composite game has not only the property established above but also captures certain essential
features of the game (A,B). For this we will first make the assumption that w.l.o.g. the entries of
A and B are positive and << 1, and we construct the matrix G given above. We further define
certain 3× 3 matrices, Dǫ1,ǫ2 , by perturbing D appropriately (see Section 3).
We then show that the Nash equilibria of the symmetric game (G,GT ) have an “image” on
the Nash equilibria of the perturbed 3 × 3 matrix, e.g., we show that payoff of the first player,
assuming (x,y) is played on the symmetric game (G,GT ), is the same as the payoff of first player if
(cl(x), cl(y)) is played on (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
), for a suitable choice of ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ
′
1, ǫ
′
2. Eventually this leads
to showing that (G,GT ) has a non-symmetric NE iff (A,B) has at least two NE, and moreover,
the non-symmetric NE of (G,GT ) are in a one-to-one correspondence with ordered pairs of NE of
(A,B). These give the NP-hardness and #P-completeness results, respectively.
Second problem: An obvious approach to designing an algorithm for finding symmetric NE in
rank-1 symmetric games is to impose symmetry in the approach of Adsul et. al. However, this
approach fails and a new approach is called for. In order to describe the salient features of the
latter, it is important to recall their approach and show where it fails.
Their approach was to start with the standard quadratic program (QP) that captures all Nash
equilibria of a given bimatrix game as optimal solutions. Since rank(A + B) = 1, A + B = cdT ,
for a suitable choice of vectors c,d. After making this substitution, the objective function of the
QP becomes the product of two linear forms. [1] replaces one of the linear forms by a parameter
λ, thereby getting a parameterized linear program LP(λ). They show that the optimal solutions
of this linear program, over all choices of λ ∈ R, are precisely all NE of a certain space of rank 1
games, i.e., (A,udT −A), for all choices of u ∈ Rm; we will denote the bimatrix game (A,udT −A)
by (A,u,d). They further show that the union of all the polyhedra defined by the constraints of
LP(λ), over all λ, is yet another polyhedron. The one-skeleton of the latter polyhedron contains a
path whose points are in one-to-one correspondence with the optimal solutions of LP(λ), over all
λ. Additionally, λ is monotonic on this path. Therefore, they are able find a NE of game (A,B)
via a binary search on this path for the “correct” value of λ.
Adapting this approach to symmetric rank one games will involve the following. We are given
game (A,AT ), where A + AT = cdT , and we seek a symmetric NE (x,x). Clearly, we must
start with the standard QP that captures symmetric equilibria of symmetric bimatrix games. The
optimal solutions of the analogous parameterized linear program are not even NE of games in the
corresponding space of rank 1 games, i.e., (A,u, c), for all choices of u ∈ Rm. The reason is that
this is not a space of symmetric games.
We rectify this situation by moving to a space of symmetric bimatrix games, but of rank 2. This
is made possible by the observation that matrix A can be written as the sum of a skew-symmetric
matrix K and the rank one matrix 12cd
T , using the fact that cdT is a symmetric matrix. Now,
replacing the vector d by u, for all choices of u ∈ Rm, we get the space of rank 2 symmetric games((
K +
1
2
cuT
)
,
(
K +
1
2
ucT
)T)
.
The new LP(λ) will capture all symmetric NE of this space of symmetric games.
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At this stage we introduce another idea, thereby achieving a substantial simplification. We
bypass the polyhedra mentioned above completely and reduce the problem of finding the “correct”
λ to a one-dimensional fixed-point computation in which every fixed point is guaranteed to be
rational. Such a fixed point can be found efficiently by a binary search and yields the “correct” λ,
which in turn yields the desired symmetric NE.
2 Preliminaries
A bimatrix game is a two player game, each player having finitely many pure strategies (moves).
Let Si, i = 1, 2 be the set of strategies for player i, and let m
def
= |S1| and n
def
= |S2|. Then such a
game can be represented by two payoff matrices A and B, each of m × n dimension. If the first
player plays strategy i and the second plays j, then the payoff of the first player is Aij and that of
the second player is Bij . Note that the rows of these matrices correspond to the strategies of the
first player and the columns to the strategies of second player.
Players may randomize among their strategies; a randomized play is called a mixed strategy.
The set of mixed strategies for the first player is X = {x = (x1, . . . , xm) | x ≥ 0,
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}, and
for the second player is Y = {y = (y1, . . . , yn) | y ≥ 0,
∑n
j=1 yj = 1}. By playing (x,y) ∈ X × Y
we mean strategies are picked independently at random as per x by the first-player and as per
y by the second-player. Therefore the expected payoffs of the first-player and second-player are,
respectively
∑
i,j Aijxiyj = x
TAy and
∑
i,j Bijxiyj = x
TBy.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium [15]) A strategy profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium strategy
profile (NESP) if no player achieves a better payoff by a unilateral deviation [12]. Formally, (x,y) ∈
X × Y is a NESP iff ∀x′ ∈ X, xTAy ≥ x′TAy and ∀y′ ∈ Y, xTBy ≥ xTBy′.
Given strategy y for the second-player, the first-player gets (Ay)k from her k
th strategy. Clearly,
her best strategies are argmaxk(Ay)k, and a mixed strategy fetches the maximum payoff only if
she randomizes among her best strategies. Similarly, given x for the first-player, the second-player
gets (xTB)k from k
th strategy, and same conclusion applies. These can be equivalently stated as
the following complementarity type conditions,
∀i ∈ S1, xi > 0 ⇒ (Ay)i = maxk∈S1(Ay)k
∀j ∈ S2, yj > 0 ⇒ (x
TB)j = maxk∈S2(x
TB)k
It is easy to get the following from the above discussion: (x,y) ∈ X×Y is a NE of game (A,B)
if and only if the following holds, where π1 and π2 are scalars.
∀i ∈ S1, (Ay)i ≤ π1; xi((Ay)i − π1) = 0
∀j ∈ S2, (x
TB)j ≤ π2; yj((x
TB)j − π2) = 0
(1)
Game (A,B) is said to be symmetric if B = AT . In a symmetric game the strategy sets of both
the players are identical, i.e., m = n, S1 = S2 and X = Y . We will use n, S and X to denote
number of strategies, the strategy set and the mixed strategy set respectively of the players in such
a game. A Nash equilibrium profile (x,y) ∈ X × X is called symmetric if x = y. Note that at
a symmetric strategy profile (x,x) both the players get payoff xTAx. Using (1) it follows that
x ∈ X is a symmetric NE of game (A,AT ), with payoff π to both players, if and only if,
∀i ∈ S, (Ax)i ≤ π; xi((Ax)i − π) = 0 (2)
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We will use the above characterization to design an efficient algorithm for finding a symmetric
NE of a rank-1 symmetric game in the Section 4. Next section analyzes hardness of finding and
counting non-symmetric NE in symmetric games.
3 NP-hardness of Non-Symmetric NE in a Symmetric Game
As discussed in the introduction, existence of symmetric NE in a symmetric game is guaranteed
[12], however, a symmetric game may not have a non-symmetric equilibrium. In this section, we
show that checking existence of non-symmetric NE in general symmetric game is NP-complete and
counting such NE is #P-complete. For the NP-completeness result, we will reduce the problem of
checking non-uniqueness of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, which is known to be NP-complete
[8], to checking if symmetric game has a non-symmetric equilibrium. Refer to the second part of
Section 1.1 for an overview of the reduction. The reduction is strong enough to also give #P-
hardness result since counting equilibria in bimatrix games is known to be #P-hard [5].
We will use the definitions and notation established in Section 1.1. Consider the following
matrix (also mentioned in Section 1.1):
D =

0 4 02 0 4
3 2 0


Lemma 2 The symmetric game (D,DT ) has a unique symmetric NE, and it has a full support.
We will prove a stronger version of Lemma 2. Given 0 ≤ ǫ1, ǫ2 << 1, define
Dǫ1,ǫ2 =

0 4 02 0 4 + ǫ1
3 2 + ǫ2 0


Proof of the following lemma, subsumes proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 Consider the bimatrix game (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T ) where 0 ≤ ǫi, ǫ
′
i << 1, i = 1, 2. The game
has a unique NE which has full support, and if Dǫ1,ǫ2 = Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
then it is a symmetric NE.
Proof : Let S1 and S2 be the support sets of first and second player at a Nash equilibrium
(x,y). Recall that, we have S1 ⊆ argmax1≤i≤3(Dǫ1,ǫ2y)i and S2 ⊆ argmax1≤j≤3(x
TDǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T )j .
We will first show that S1 = S2 = {1, 2, 3} for all NE of the game by discarding each of the case
where |Si| = 1 and |Si| = 2 for i = 1, 2.
Case 1. |S1| = 1 or |S2| = 1.
We will derive a contradiction for |S1| = 1, and the other case follows similarly. Suppose
S1 = {1}, then x = (1, 0, 0), and x
TDǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T =
[
0 2 3
]
⇒ S2 ⊂ {3}. Thus only best response to
x is y = (0, 0, 1), and it is easy to see ((1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)) is not a NE. Similarly if S1 = {2} then to
x = (0, 1, 0) the only best response is y = (1, 0, 0) which is not a NE, and if S1 = {3} then best
response to x = (0, 0, 1) is y = (0, 1, 0), again not a NE.
Case 2. |S1| = 2 or |S2| = 2.
Again, we will derive a contradiction for |S1| = 2, and the other case follows similarly. Suppose
S1 = {1, 2}, then we have x = (p1, p2, 0) such that p1 + p2 = 1, and
xTDTǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
=
[
4p2 2p1 3p1 + (2 + ǫ
′
2)p2
]
.
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Therefore, S2 = {1, 3} in all NE which has S1 = {1, 2} (as |S2| > 1 due to Case 1), so let
y = (q1, 0, q3). In that case Dǫ1,ǫ2y =
[
0 2q1 + (4 + ǫ1)q3 3q1
]
, and therefore S1 ⊂ {2, 3}, a
contradiction. Similarly, S1 = {1, 3} ⇒ S2 = {2, 3} ⇒ S1 ⊂ {1, 2}, and S1 = {2, 3} ⇒ S2 =
{1, 2} ⇒ S1 ⊂ {1, 3}, contradictions.
Thus the only possibility we are left with is S1 = S2 = {1, 2, 3} for all NE of the game. Next
we show that there is a unique NE with this support. Let ((p1, p2, p3), (q1, q2, q3)) be a NE of the
game. Since S2 = {1, 2, 3}, we have:
4p2 = 2p1 + (4 + ǫ
′
1)p3 = 3p1 + (2 + ǫ
′
2)p2, p1 + p2 + p3 = 1
Clearly, the only solution of the above equalities is p1 =
2
7 + ǫ
′′
1 , p2 =
3
7 + ǫ
′′
2, p3 =
2
7 + ǫ
′′
3, where
ǫ′′i > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 depends on ǫ1 and ǫ2. We can write similar equalities for (q1, q2, q3) using NE
conditions for the first player, which has a unique solution q1 =
2
7 + ǫ
′′′
1 , q2 =
3
7 + ǫ
′′′
2 , q3 =
2
7 + ǫ
′′′
3 .
Since existence of symmetric NE in a symmetric game is guaranteed, if Dǫ1,ǫ2 = Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
, then
the only NE of such a game is symmetric. ✷
As observed in Section 1.1, the well known reduction from a bimatrix game (A,B) to symmetric
game G =
[
0 A
BT 0
]
is not useful for our purpose. This is because, non-symmetric NE of (G,GT )
can be of the form ((a,0), (0, b)), and therefore fails to produce more than one NE of game (A,B).
Next we show how to circumvent this issue by constructing a suitable matrix G using the game of
Lemma 3 such that no component in non-symmetric NE is zero, and it relates to a unique pair of
NE of game (A,B). This one-to-one correspondence gives #P -hardness result as well.
Recall the following, where Kc×d(k) is a c× d dimensional matrix with all entries set to k ∈ R.
K =

 0 K1×m(4) K1×n(0)Km×1(2) Km×m(0) Km×n(4)
Kn×1(3) Kn×m(2) Kn×n(0)

 G = K +

 0 0 00 0 A
0 BT 0


Before we go into proving our claims, we define a few terms and functions, to be used in the
rest of the section. For any non-zero, non-negative vector z, of any dimension, let η(z) denote the
normalized vector, i.e., its components are non-negative and add to 1. For a matrix M and two
non-zero vectors z1,z2 ≥ 0 of appropriate dimensions, we define,
P (M ;z1,z2)
def
= η(z1)
TMη(z2)
i.e., the payoffs obtained by player with payoff matrix M at strategy profile (η(z1), η(z2)).
Given a strategy profile (x,y) of game (G,GT ), where x = (c,a, b) and y = (c′,a′, b′), or given
NE (a, b′) and (a′, b) for game (A,B), define
ǫ1
def
= P (A;a, b′), ǫ2
def
= P (B;a′, b), ǫ′1
def
= P (A;a′, b) ǫ′2
def
= P (B;a, b′) (3)
For x = (c,a, b), recall that cl(x)
def
= (c,
∑
i ai,
∑
j bj). Next we show a connection between
payoffs in game (G,GT ) and in game (Dǫ1,ǫ2,D
T
ǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
).
Lemma 4 P (G;x,y) = P (Dǫ1,ǫ2; cl(x), cl(y)), and P (G
T ;x,y) = P (DT
ǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
; cl(x), cl(y)).
Proof : We will prove the first part, and the second part follows similarly. Let v = (v1, v2, v3) =
cl(x) and w = (w1, w2, w3) = cl(y). Then,
P (G;x,y) = xTGy = xTKy + xT

0 0 00 0 A
0 BT 0

y = xTKy + aTAb′ + a′TBb
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where, xTKy = 2v2w1 + 3v3w1 + 4v1w2 + 2v3w2 + 4v2w3. Note that a = (
∑
i≤m ai) ∗ η(a) =
v2η(a), and similarly b = v3η(b), a
′ = w2η(a
′) and b′ = w3η(b
′). Thus, aTAb′ + a′TBb =
η(a)TAη(b′)v2w3 + η(a
′)TBη(b)v3w2 and hence
P (G;x,y) = 2v2w1 + 3v3w1 + 4v1w2 + 2v3w2 + 4v2w3 + η(a)
TAη(b′)v2w3 + η(a
′)
T
Bη(b)v3w2.
On the other hand we have P (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ; cl(x), cl(y)) = 2v2w1 + 3v3w1 + 4v1w2 + 2v3w2 + 4v2w3 +
ǫ1v2w3 + ǫ2v3w2. Since, ǫ1 = P (A;a, b
′) = η(a)TAη(b′) and ǫ2 = P (B;a
′, b) = η(a′)TBη(b) the
lemma follows. ✷
Lemma 4 implies equivalence between payoffs in games (G,GT ) and (Dǫ1,ǫ2,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T ), when the
strategies are mapped appropriately. Using this, next we establish relation between their NE.
Lemma 5 If (x,y) is a NE for the game (G,GT ) then (cl(x), cl(y)) is a NE of game (Dǫ1,ǫ2,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T ),
where ǫs are defined as per (3).
Proof : To the contrary suppose (v,w) = (cl(x), cl(y)) is not a NE of game (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T ).
Without loss of generality (wlog) suppose first player can deviate to v′ and get a better payoff. Let
x′ = (v′1, v
′
2η(a), v
′
3η(b)). We claim that in game (G,G
T ) first player can deviate to x′ and gain,
i.e., P (G;x′,y) > P (G;x,y), contradicting (x,y) being NE.
Note that the values of ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ
′
1, ǫ
′
2 for (x,y) and (x
′,y) are the same (see (3)). Then, using
Lemma 4 we have: P (G;x,y) = P (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ;v,w) < P (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ;v
′,w) = P (G;x′,y). ✷
The next corollary follows using Lemmas 3 and 5.
Corollary 6 If (x,y) is NE for the game (G,GT ), where x = (c,a, b) and y = (c′,a′, b′), then
vectors a,a′, b, b′ are non-zero.
As was our goal, the above corollary establishes non-zeroness of sub-components of a NE (x,y)
of the symmetric game (G,GT ) that we constructed from (A,B). Using this property we will show
how non-symmetric NE of game (G,GT ) give two distinct NE of game (A,B) and vice-versa.
Lemma 7 If (x,y) is a NE for the game (G,GT ), where x = (c,a, b) and y = (c′,a′, b′), then
(η(a), η(b′)) and (η(a′), η(b)) both are NE for the game (A,B).
Proof : We will show that (η(a), η(b′)) is NE for the game (A,B), and the proof for (η(a′), η(b))
is analogous. By contradiction, wlog suppose the first player can change η(a) to η(a′′) and get a
better payoff, where
∑
1≤i≤m ai =
∑
1≤i≤m a
′′
i . Then, we have cl(x) = cl(x
′) and η(a)TAη(b′) <
η(a′′)TAη(b′).
Let x′ = (c,a′′, b). In the proof of Lemma 4 we showed that for v = cl(x) and w = cl(y),
P (G;x,y) = 2v2w1+3v3w1+4v1w2+2v3w2+4v2w3+η(a)
TAη(b′)v2w3+η(a
′)TBη(b)v3w2. Then,
P (G;x,y)− P (G,x′,y) = η(a)TAη(b′)v2w3 + η(a
′)TBη(b)v3w2−
η(a′′)TAη(b′)v2w3 − η(a
′)TBη(b)v3w2
= η(a)TAη(b′)v2w3 − η(a
′′)TAη(b′)v2w3 < 0
A contradiction to (x,y) being a NE of (G,GT ). ✷
Next we prove the reverse of Lemmas 5 and 7.
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Lemma 8 If (a, b′) and (a′, b) are NE of game (A,B), and if for ǫs defined in (3), (v,w) is a NE
of game (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
), then ((v1, v2 ∗ a, v3 ∗ b), (w1, w2 ∗ a
′, w3 ∗ b
′)) is a NE of game (G,GT ).
Proof : Let x = (v1, v2∗a, v3 ∗b) and y = (w1, w2∗a
′, w3∗b
′). We will check the complementary
conditions (1) for (x,y). Let S1 be the support set of first player and S2 be the support set of
second player w.r.t. profile (x,y). In particular, we need to show:
∀i ∈ S1, (Gy)i = max1≤i≤m(Gy)i, ∀i ∈ S2, (x
TGT )i = max1≤i≤n(x
TGT )i.
We next show the first condition, and the proof for the second condition is similar. Let z = Gy,
then, z1 = 4w2; 2 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1, zi = 2w1 + 4w3 + w3(Ab
′)i−1; m + 2 ≤ j ≤ n +m + 1, zj =
3w1 + 2w2 + w2(B
Ta′)j−m−1. The max among these three sets of strategies are max1 = 4w1,
max2 = 2w1+4w3+w3maxi≤m(Ab
′)i and max3 = 3w1+2w2+w2maxj≤n(a
′TB)j. If we show that
max1 = max2 = max3 then lemma follows using the fact that a is a best response of the first-player
against b′, b is a best response of the second-player against a′ in game (A,B) (as (a, b′) and (a′, b)
are its NE).
Since (v,w) is NE for the game (Dǫ1,ǫ2,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T ) where ǫ1 = a
TAb′ and ǫ2 = a
′TBb, and it is
of full support (Lemma 3), we have 4w2 = 2w1 + 4w3 + w3ǫ1 = 3w1 + 2w2 + w2ǫ2. On the other
hand, (a, b′) and (a′, b) being NE for the game (A,B) implies ǫ1 = a
TAb′ = max1≤i≤m(Ab
′)i and
ǫ2 = a
′TBb = max1≤j≤n(a
′TB)j. Thus we get max1 = max2 = max3 as desired. ✷
The next theorem follows directly using Lemmas 5, 7 and 8.
Theorem 9 For x = (c,a, b) and y = (c′,a′, b′), (x,y) is a NE of game (G,GT ) iff (cl(x), cl(y))
is a NE of (Dǫ1,ǫ2,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
), where ǫs are defined as in (3), and (η(a), η(b′)) and (η(a′), η(b)) are
both NE of game (A,B).
To show NP-hardness of computing non-symmetric NE in symmetric games, we need to establish
connection between non-symmetric NE of game (G,GT ) and a pair of distinct NE of game (A,B).
Theorem 9 almost does the job except that no such conditions are imposed on the NE of (G,GT )
and of (A,B). Next theorem achieves exactly this.
Theorem 10 The symmetric game (G,GT ) has a non-symmetric NE iff the game (A,B) has more
than one NE.
Proof : (⇒) Let (x,y) be a non-symmetric NE of (G,GT ), where x = (c,a, b) and y = (c′,a′, b′).
Then, using Theorem 9, (η(a), η(b′)) and (η(a′), η(b)) are NE for the game (A,B). We need to
show that these are distinct. To the contrary suppose η(a) = η(a′) and η(b) = η(b′). Then, ǫ1 = ǫ
′
1
and ǫ2 = ǫ
′
2. Further, (cl(x), cl(y)) being NE of (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ,Dǫ′1,ǫ′2
T ) (Theorem 9), we have cl(x) = cl(y)
(Lemma 3). This together with η(a) = η(a′) and η(b) = η(b′) implies c = c′, a = a′ and b = b′, a
contradiction.
(⇐)Let (a, b′) and (a′, b) be two different NE for the game (A,B), and let (v,w) be NE for
the game (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T ). Let x = (v1, v2a, v3b) and y = (w1, w2a
′, w3b
′). then using Theorem 9
(x,y) is a NE of game (G,GT ). Further, (a, b′) 6= (a′, b) implies x 6= y. ✷
Note that, size of (G,GT ) is O(size(A,B)), and hence Theorem 10 implies polynomial-time
reduction from the problem of checking if a bimatrix game has more than one NE to checking if a
symmetric two-player game has a non-symmetric NE. Since former is NP-complete [8], this shows
NP-hardness for the latter. Containment in NP follows since all NE of games (G,GT ) are rational
numbers of size polynomial in the size (bit-length) of G [14]. Thus we get the next theorem.
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Theorem 11 Checking existence of a non-symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric game is
NP-complete.
The proof of Theorem 10 does not indicate how the number of equilibria in the games relate to
each other. We explore this in the next theorem to show the #P -completeness result.
Theorem 12 There is a one-to-one correspondence between ordered pairs of NE of the game (A,B)
and non-symmetric NE of the symmetric game (G,GT ).
Proof : First we show that for every ordered pair of NE of the game (A,B), ((a, b′), (a′, b)), there
is a unique non-symmetric NE for the game (G,GT ). Let (v,w) be NE for the game (Dǫ1,ǫ2 ,Dǫ′
1
,ǫ′
2
T ).
Let x = (v1, v2a, v3b) and y = (w1, w2a
′, w3b
′), then (x,y) is a non-symmetric NE of (G,GT )
(Theorem 10). Similarly if another NE pair ((α,β′), (α′,β)) also gives (x,y), then using Lemma
7 α = a, β′ = b′, α′ = a′ and β = b.
Next, for every non-symmetric NE (x,y) of game (G,GT ), we will construct a unique pair of
distinct NE for game (A,B). Let x = (c,a, b) and y = (c′,a′, b′), then (η(a), η(b′)) and (η(a′), η(b))
are two different NE for the game (A,B) (Theorem 10). Suppose another symmetric NE (x′,y′) of
(G,GT ), where x′ = (o,p, q) and y′ = (o′,p′, q′), gives the same pair, i.e., η(p) = η(a), η(q) = η(b),
η(p′) = η(a′) and η(q′) = η(b′). Then, ǫi and ǫ
′
i, i = 1, 2 defined in (3) are the same for both (x,y)
and (x′,y′). Therefore, using Lemma 3 and Theorem 9, we have (cl(x), cl(y)) = (cl(x′), cl(y′)),
implying (x,y) = (x′,y′). ✷
The next theorem follows using the fact that counting the number of NE in a bimatrix game
is #P -hard [5], and Theorem 12. Here, containment in #P follows from the rationality of NE in
bimatrix games.
Theorem 13 Counting the number non-symmetric equilibria in a symmetric game is #P -complete.
4 Efficient Algorithm for Symmetric Rank-1 Games
In this section we consider computing symmetric NE in symmetric constant rank games. Recall
that rank of a two player game (A,B) is defined as rank(A+B). Adsul et al. [1] gave a polynomial
time algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 bimatrix game. In case of a symmetric
game, the Nash equilibrium found by the algorithm need not be symmetric. In what follows, we
design a polynomial time algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium in symmetric rank-1
games. Our algorithm is an extension of the Adsul et al. approach.
Let (A,AT ) be a symmetric game, where A is an n×n square matrix. As discussed in Section 2
a mixed-strategy x ∈ X is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of game (A,AT ) if and only if it satisfies
(2). Using this, the next lemma follows.
Lemma 14 If x ∈ X satisfies first part of (2) then xTAx − π ≤ 0. Equality holds iff x is a
symmetric NE of (A,AT ).
Using Lemma 14 we get the following quadratic program which exactly captures the symmetric
Nash equilibria of game (A,AT ).
max : xTAx− π
s.t. Ax ≤ π; x ≥ 0;
∑
i∈S xi = 1
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Note that, the objective value of the above program is at most zero, and exactly zero at the
optimal (Lemma 14). If the rank of game (A,AT ) is one then A + AT = c · dT , where c,d ∈ Rn.
Note that c · dT is a symmetric matrix, and therefore, we have c · dT = d · cT
We will represent matrix A as sum of a skew-symmetric matrix and a rank-1 symmetric matrix.
Let K be a matrix such that kij = aij −
cidj
2 . This implies A = K +
1
2c · d
T . Since, c · dT = d · cT
and A + AT = c · dT , we get K +KT = 0. Thus, K is skew-symmetric, and therefore zTKz = 0
for any vector z ∈ Rn. Replacing A = K + 12c · d
T in the above quadratic program we get,
max : 12(x
Tc)(dTx)− π
s.t. Kx+ c2 (d
Tx) ≤ π; x ≥ 0;
∑
i xi = 1
The above formulation is a rank-1 quadratic program, which is NP-hard in general. However,
we will show that it can be solved in polynomial time using the Nash equilibrium properties. The
feasible region of the above program is linear, while the cost function is quadratic which introduces
the difficulty. The idea is to construct an LP-type formulation, using the fact that the quadratic
term is a product of two linear terms, while maintaining the fact that optimal value of the new
formulation is also zero and it is achieved only when complementarity is satisfied. Towards this, we
first replace dTx by λ in the objective function as well as in the inequality. This gives the following
optimization problem where x is a variable vector, and π and λ are scalar variables.
max : 12λ(x
Tc)− π
s.t. Kx+ c2λ ≤ π; x ≥ 0;
∑
i xi = 1
(4)
Lemma 15 Let (x, λ, π) be a feasible point of (4), then 12λ(x
Tc) − π ≤ 0. Equality holds iff
xi(Kx+
c
2λ− π)i = 0, ∀i ∈ [n].
Proof : Since (x, λ, π) satisfies (Kx+ c2λ)i ≤ π and xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n], we have xi(Kx+
c
2λ−π)i ≤
0. Summing up over all i, and using
∑
i xi = 1 and x
TKx = 0, we get 12λ(x
Tc)− π ≤ 0. Further,
if xi(Kx+
c
2λ− π)i = 0,∀i ∈ [n] then
1
2λ(x
Tc)− π = 0, and vice-versa. ✷
Note that, formulation (4) is independent of vector d, an essential for our original game. This
seems very counter intuitive at first. However, this very property allows (4) to capture NE of a space
of games, as established next. Finally, we will use this rich structure to formulate one-dimensional
fixed point to solve our game. Next lemma shows that the solution set (4) is rich enough to contain
a point for every value of λ.
Lemma 16 Given λ ∈ R, ∃(x, π) ∈ Rn+1 such that (x, λ, π) is a solution of (4), and the objective
value is zero at (x, λ, π).
Proof : Let v = λ∗1, where 1 is an n-dimensional vector with all 1s. Now, consider a symmetric
game with matrix Z = K + 12cv
T . Let z be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of this game and π be
the corresponding payoff zTZz, then vTz = λ. Therefore, using (2) we have
∀i ∈ [n] : (Kz +
c
2
λ)i ≤ π; zi((Kz +
c
2
λ)i − π) = 0
The first inequality implies that (z, λ, π) is feasible in (4), and the second implies that objective
value is zero at it. Therefore, it has to be optimal due to Lemma 15. ✷
Lemmas 15 and 16 imply that the optimal value of (4) is zero, and for every a ∈ R there is
an optimal solution with λ = a. If we substitute some value for λ in (4), then it becomes an LP.
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Therefore, consider it as a parameterized linear program LP (λ). The optimal value of LP (λ) for
any λ ∈ R is zero (due to Lemma 16). Therefore, solutions of (4) are exactly the solutions of
LP (λ), ∀λ ∈ R.
Remark 17 Let S be the set of optimal solutions of (4). Since the optimal value of (4) is zero,
it is easy to see that (x, λ, π) ∈ S if and only if ∀i ∈ [n], xi(Kx −
c
2λ − π)i = 0, which requires
n equalities. Let us assume that the polyhedron of (4) in (x, π, λ)-space is non-degenerate. Due to
the equality
∑
i xi = 1, the polyhedron is in (n+ 1)-dimension. Now, since at least n equalities are
tight on every point of S, we get S ⊂ 1-skeleton of the polyhedron. Further, we can show that every
vertex of S has degree two in S, and thus S forms cycles and paths (with unbounded edges on both
ends). In addition, for any a ∈ R, the set of points of S with λ = a are exactly the solutions of
LP (a) which must be a closed and convex set. Using all these properties it is easy to see that S
forms a single path, on which λ changes monotonically. In this paper, we bypass the polyhedron
completely and give a much simpler approach in the next lemma.
The result of next lemma is central to the construction of one-dimensional fixed point formula-
tion for solving our original game (A,AT ).
Lemma 18 Given a λ ∈ R, if (x, π) is a solution of the LP (λ) then for any v ∈ Rn satisfying
vTx = λ, x is a symmetric NE of game (Z,ZT ), where Z = K + 12cv
T .
Proof : Let (x, π) be a solution of LP (λ), then since feasible region of LP (λ) is a subset of the
feasible region of (4), vector (x, λ, π) satisfies (Kx − c2λ)i ≤ π; x ≥ 0;
∑
i xi = 1. This ensures
that x is a probability distribution vector. Due to Lemma 16, it also satisfies xi(Kx+
c
2λ− π)i =
0, ∀i ∈ [n]. Setting, λ = vTx, these conditions are exactly that of (2) for strategy x and game
(Z,ZT ) where Z = K + 12cv
T . ✷
Remark 19 Note that both the matrices of the games constructed in Lemma 18 change with v,
and cvT need not be a symmetric matrix. Therefore, rank(Z + ZT ) = 2. In the Adsul et. al.
approach, the first matrix is same in all the games, and the solutions of LP (λ) are NE of a family
of rank-1 games, which crucially uses the fact that y need not be same as x (non-symmetric). For
this reason, their approach is not immediately applicable for finding symmetric NE.
Lemma 18 implies that if we can find a λ such that the solution (x, π) of LP (λ) satisfies
dTx = λ, then x is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of our original rank-1 game (A,AT ). Using
this observation, consider a 1-dimensional correspondence F : [dmin, dmax] → 2
[dmin, dmax], where
dmin = mini∈[n] di and dmax = maxi∈[n] di.
F (λ) = {dTx | x is a solution of LP (λ)}
By definition we have that ∀λ ∈ [dmin, dmax], F (λ) is non-empty (Lemma 16) and convex. Now
using the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, F has fixed-points. Clearly, every fixed-point of F gives a
Nash equilibrium by Lemma 18, and the next theorem follows.
Theorem 20 The fixed points of F exactly capture the Nash equilibria of the game (A,AT ).
Since the Nash equilibrium profiles of game (A,AT ) are rational vectors of size polynomial in the
size of A [15], the fixed-points of F are also rational numbers of polynomial sized (using Theorem
20). Thus, one can compute an exact fixed point of F in polynomial time using a simple binary
search starting with the pivots dmin and dmax, and the next theorem follows.
Theorem 21 The problem of computing a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric rank-1
game is in P.
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5 Discussion
As stated in the Introduction, the complexity of finding a symmetric NE in a symmetric game of
rank 2, 3, 4, or 5 remain open. It is easy to show that for any k ≥ 1, the rank k problem reduces to
the k-dimensional fixed point problem, which is PPAD-hard for k ≥ 2. Clearly, one way of resolving
these questions is to find a reduction in the reverse direction. The structure of these problems seem
to indicate that such reductions should exist and all these problems should be hard.
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Appendix
A Imitation Games
Given an n× n matrix A, consider a bimatrix game (A, I), where I is the n× n identity matrix is
called an imitation matrix. The name arises from the fact that when restricted to pure strategies,
the second player gets a payoff of 1 if she plays the same strategy as the first player and 0 otherwise.
Imitation games lead to simple reductions between games. We illustrate this in Lemma 22 which
leads to a reduction from NE in a bimatrix game to a symmetric NE in a symmetric bimatrix game
and is well known.
Lemma 22 [10] Let (x,y) be a Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game (A, I) where A is an n × n
matrix of positive entries and I is the n × n identity matrix. Then (y,y) is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium for (A,AT ).
Proof : Let α = maxi (Ay)i and β = maxi (Ix)i. Clearly, α > 0 and β > 0. Since (x,y) is a
Nash equilibrium for (A, I),
• ∀i : xi > 0 ⇒ (Ay)i = α . . . (1).
• ∀i : yi > 0 ⇒ (Ix)i = β . . . (2).
It is enough show that ∀i : yi > 0 ⇒ (Ay)i = α. Clearly, yi > 0 ⇒ (Ix)i = β > 0, (by (2))
⇒ xi > 0 ⇒ (Ay)i = α (by (1)). ✷
An n× n matrix will be said to be a positive diagonal matrix if each of its diagonal entries is a
positive number and each of the non-diagonal entries is zero. Observe that Lemma 22 holds even
if I is replaced by an arbitrary positive diagonal matrix. This immediately raises the questions,
“By changing the positive diagonal matrix, are we guaranteed to get a different symmetric Nash
equilibrium for (A,AT )? If so, can we get all symmetric Nash equilibria in this manner?” Theorem
23 provides a negative answer to the first question and Theorem 24 provides additional insights to
the second question.
Theorem 23 Let (x,y) be a Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game (A, I) and D be a positive diag-
onal matrix with di > 0 in the i
th diagonal entry. Let s =
∑
i xi/di and let x
′ be the vector whose
ith entry is x′i = xi/(sdi). Then (x
′,y) is a Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game (A,D).
Proof : Clearly x′i ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
∑
i x
′
i = s/s = 1, hence x
′ is a probability vector.
Clearly, xi > 0 iff x
′
i > 0. Therefore, since x is a best response to y in the game (A, I), x
′ is a best
response to y in the game (A,D).
Let maxi (Ix)i = β. Clearly, maxi (Dx
′)i = β/s; furthermore, the set of indices which achieve
maximum are the same in both equalities. Therefore, yi > 0 ⇒ (Ix)i = β ⇒ (Dx
′)i = β/s.
Therefore, y is a best response to x′ in the game (A,D), hence proving the theorem. ✷
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Lemma 22 and Theorem 23 raise the question, “Consider the bimatrix game (A,D) for a fixed
positive diagonal matrix D. Can one characterize the set of symmetric Nash equilibria y of (A,AT )
such that (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A,D) for some probability vector x?” Theorem
24 implies that this set consists of all symmetric Nash equilibria of (A,AT ).
Theorem 24 Let y be any symmetric Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game (A,AT ) and D be a
positive diagonal matrix. Then there is a probability vector x such that (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium
for bimatrix game (A,D).
Proof : We will construct a probability vector x such that (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium for
bimatrix game (A, I). Then, the needed result will follow from Theorem 23.
Let S = {i | (Ay)i > 0}. Let x be the probability vector whose i
th coordinate is 1/|S| if i ∈ S
and 0 otherwise. Let maxi (Ay)i = α. Since y is a symmetric Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game
(A,AT ), ∀i : yi > 0 ⇒ (Ay)i = α. Therefore, the set of indices which achieve maximum in x are
the same as those in y, hence showing that (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game (A, I).
✷
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